Re Indalex: The confluence of pension, insolvency, and fiduciary law by Zhou, David
Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies
Volume 25 Article 5
1-1-2016
Re Indalex: The confluence of pension, insolvency,
and fiduciary law
David Zhou
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/djls
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Schulich Scholars. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dalhousie Journal of
Legal Studies by an authorized editor of Schulich Scholars. For more information, please contact hannah.steeves@dal.ca.
Recommended Citation







The landmark decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Re Indalex Ltd. dealt 
with many issues, including both the treatment of a deemed trust prescribed 
under the Ontario Pension Benefits Act (“PBA”) in the context of insolvency 
proceedings under the Companies Creditors’ Arrangement Act (“CCAA”), and the 
fiduciary duty owed by a debtor company in its dual role as employer sponsor 
and administrator of pension plans. This paper analyzes and critiques the 
court’s handling of these two issues, arguing that the court’s holding that the 
PBA deemed trust continues to apply under the CCAA (subject to the doctrine 
of federal paramountcy) represents a departure from its prior decisions, raises 
troubling policy implications, and calls into question established jurisprudence 
on a related issue in Canadian insolvency law. In addition, this paper shows 
that the five justices who formed the majority in the result did not formulate a 
unified approach to ascertaining the nature and scope of the fiduciary duty of 
an employer-administrator of pension plans, though they were in agreement 
that the insolvent company’s decision to commence proceedings under the 
CCAA in and of itself did not create a conflict between the company’s self 
interest and its fiduciary duty as plan administrator. Finally, this paper argues 
that the interplay between the court’s holdings on the two issues leads to a legal 
contradiction for employer-administrators that are insolvent or nearing 
insolvency.  
 
Citation: (2016) 25 Dal J Leg Stud 165. 
                                                                                                                                         
*   David is an associate in the Business Law Group of McMillan LLP, having earned his J.D. at the 
University of Toronto in 2015. David wishes to thank Mitch Frazer and Ari Kaplan, who co-taught the 
course in pension law that gave rise to this paper, and Andrea Boctor, for her invaluable comments and 
suggestions during the writing and revision of this paper. 
 
 
138 PENSION, INSOLVENCY AND FIDUCIARY LAW Vol. 25 
 
Since its release, the Supreme Court of Canada’s (the “SCC”) decision in Re 
Indalex Ltd.1 has engendered extensive commentary by practitioners and scholars 
of insolvency law in Canada. An extraordinarily complex decision that is situated 
at the confluence of pension law, insolvency law and fiduciary law, Indalex dealt 
with four main issues, as follows:  
I. Does the deemed trust provided for in s. 57(4) of the Ontario Pension 
Benefits Act2 (“PBA”) (the “PBA deemed trust”) apply to wind-up 
deficiencies? 
II. If so, does the deemed trust supersede the debtor-in-possession 
(“DIP”) charge? 
III. Did the debtor, Indalex Limited (“Indalex”) owe any fiduciary 
obligations to the members of its pension plans when making 
decisions in the context of the insolvency proceedings? 
IV. Did the Ontario Court of Appeal (the “ONCA”) properly exercise 
its discretion in imposing a constructive trust to remedy the breaches 
of fiduciary duties?3 
The seven justices who heard the case produced three separate sets of 
written reasons: Justice Deschamps penned the reasons for judgment on behalf 
of herself and Justice Moldaver; Justice Cromwell wrote concurring reasons on 
behalf of himself, Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Rothstein; and Justice 
LeBel issued dissenting reasons with Justice Abella concurring. On issue I, the 
dissent agreed with Justice Deschamps in answering in the affirmative, while 
Justice Cromwell disagreed. All seven justices unanimously answered issue II in 
the negative and the issue III in the affirmative, though for significantly different 
reasons. With respect to issue IV, the five-member majority were in agreement 
that the answer was no, while Justice LeBel and Justice Abella disagreed.  
                                                                                                                                         
1 Re Indalex Ltd., 2013 SCC 6, 1 SCR 271 [Indalex (SCC)].  
2 Pension Benefits Act, RSO 1990, c P8. 





This paper focuses on issues II and III stated above. On issue II, the SCC 
in Indalex held that the PBA deemed trust continues to apply in the context of 
proceedings under the Companies Creditors’ Arrangement Act4 (“CCAA”), subject to 
the doctrine of federal paramountcy.5 This paper argues that this represents a 
departure from the SCC’s prior decisions where the court treated the CCAA and 
the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act6 (“BIA”) as having a consistent scheme for 
determining priorities in insolvency proceedings. Such a departure is troubling 
from a public policy perspective, because inconsistent treatment of priorities 
under the twin insolvency regimes would create skewed incentives against 
reorganizing under the CCAA, to the detriment of the CCAA’s legislative 
objectives. Moreover, the holding calls into question the existing case law on the 
related legal issue of under what circumstances the stay of proceedings under the 
CCAA should be lifted to permit creditors to petition a debtor into bankruptcy. 
With respect to issue III, this paper examines the fiduciary duty of a plan 
administrator both at common law and as prescribed by the PBA. The facts of 
the Indalex case challenged the SCC to re-fashion the law of fiduciary duty in order 
to properly apprehend the nature and scope of the fiduciary duty of Indalex that 
acted as both the employer sponsor and the administrator of its pension plans—
a dual role commonly referred to as “employer-administrator”. Justice 
Deschamps and Justice Cromwell articulated two somewhat different approaches 
in their written reasons, but they and their respective concurring justices were in 
agreement that Indalex’s decision to pursue restructuring under the CCAA in and 
of itself did not create a conflict between the company’s self-interest and its 
fiduciary duty as plan administrator.  
Beyond analyzing and critiquing two of the SCC’s holdings in Indalex, this 
paper considers the interplay between these holdings and concludes that the two 
holdings lead to a legal contradiction regarding whether an employer-
administrator is permitted to commence insolvency proceedings under the 
                                                                                                                                         
4 Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, RSC 1985, c C-36, as amended.  
5 Indalex (SCC), supra note 1 at para 52 and 242. 
6 Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, RSC 1985, c B-3.  
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CCAA without first winding up its pension plans. The resolution of this 
contradiction may require legislative amendment or regulatory oversight aimed at 
providing courts with clearer guidance on the proper balancing of the interests of 
various stakeholders in the context of corporate insolvency.   
Indalex was a wholly-owned Canadian subsidiary of the US-based company, 
Indalex Holding Corp (“Indalex US”).7 The Indalex group operated an aluminum 
extrusion business in North America.8 On 3 April, 2009, Indalex filed for 
protection under the CCAA.9 At the time, Indalex was the employer-
administrator of two defined benefit pension plans.10 The plan for Indalex’s 
salaried employees was in the process of being wound up11, while the other, for 
certain former executives, was closed to new entrants but not yet in wind-up.12 
When Indalex initiated the CCAA proceedings, both plans had funding 
deficiencies calculated on a wind-up basis.13 
Less than a week after Indalex sought protection from its creditors by 
applying for a stay under the CCAA, the company persuaded the CCAA judge, 
Justice Morawetz to grant a court order approving a DIP financing loan.14 The 
order granted, in favour of the DIP lenders, a super-priority status over all existing 
debt and other claims. Subsequently, Indalex and Indalex US pursued a sale of all 
of their assets on a going-concern basis under a court-approved process. They 
received only one bid, whereby the bidder would not assume the debtor 
companies’ pension liabilities.15 The debtor companies then brought motions for 
a court order approving the bid and directing the sale proceeds to be paid to the 
DIP lenders. Indalex’s pension plan members opposed the proposed distribution 
                                                                                                                                         
7 Indalex (SCC), supra note 1 at para 3.  
8 Ibid.  
9 Ibid at para 3. Indalex US had already filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in Delaware in March 2009.  
10 Ibid at para 5. 
11 Ibid. The effective date of the wind up was 31 December 2006. 
12 Ibid.  
13 Ibid at para 6.  
14 Ibid at para 9.  





to the DIP lenders; they argued that their claims—that is, the funding deficiencies 
in the pension plans—were deemed to be held in trust pursuant to s.57(4) of the 
PBA, and therefore ranked in priority to the claims of the DIP lenders.16  
After the going-concern sale of the Canadian business, a priority dispute 
ensued between the pension plan members—who relied on the deemed trust 
provisions under the Ontario PBA—and the DIP lenders—who held a super-
priority charge granted by Justice Morawetz. The SCC unanimously sided with 
the latter. Their reasoning proceeded in two steps. First, the CCAA does not 
expressly provide for all of the priorities set out in the BIA, and courts may not 
read BIA priorities into the CCAA at will.17 Hence, priorities created under 
provincial legislation, such as the PBA deemed trust, continue to apply in CCAA 
proceedings subject to the doctrine of federal paramountcy.18 Second, a court-
ordered priority has the same effect as a statutory priority.19 Applying this 
reasoning to the facts, the Court found the DIP charge superseded the PBA 
deemed trust on the basis that the latter was incompatible with and frustrated the 
purpose of the court-ordered DIP charge pursuant to the doctrine of federal 
paramountcy.20 
The first step of the above analysis necessarily implies that the CCAA and 
the BIA need not be consistent with respect to priority rules. Such an implication 
flies in the face of pre-Indalex case law21 which treated the BIA as setting out a 
                                                                                                                                         
16 Ibid at para 14.  
17 Indalex (SCC), supra note 1 at para 51. 
18 Ibid at para 52-53. 
19 Ibid at para 60. 
20 Ibid at para 54-60. 
21 Continental Casualty Co v MacLeod-Stedman Inc, [1996] M.J No 551, 43 CBR (3d) 211 (CA); British ColumBIA v 
Henfrey Samson Belair Ltd, [1989] 2 SCR 24 [Henfrey]; and General Chemical Canada Ltd (Re), [2007] OJ No 
3296, 2007 ONCA 600, including the lower court decision at [2006] OJ No. 3087, 22 CBR (5th) 298 (SCJ), 
leave to appeal refused [2007] SCCA No 539 (SCC). See also GE Canada Equipment Financing GP v Northern 
Sawills Inc, [2012] OJ No 5633, 2012 ONSC 6664 and Everingham Brothers Ltd (Re), [1999] OJ No 774, 43 
OR (3d) 594 (CA). 
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complete code of priority rules that occupied the whole legislative field and 
rendered all statutory deemed trusts ineffective, with the exceptions of those 
deemed trusts which have all the common law attributes of trusts and those that 
are set out in s.67(3) of the BIA. The leading authority predating Indalex is the 
2010 decision in Century Services Inc v Canada (Attorney General)22. In that case, the 
SCC considered whether the statutory deemed trust in respect of GST 
remittances continued to apply in CCAA proceedings. The majority answered in 
the negative on the basis that the twin insolvency regimes were “in harmony”23 
and shared a “point of convergence”24 with respect to priorities. Justice 
Deschamps, writing for the majority in Century Services, stated:  
Because the CCAA is silent about what happens if reorganization fails, 
the BIA scheme of liquidation and distribution necessarily supplies the 
backdrop for what will happen if a CCAA reorganization is ultimately 
unsuccessful.25  
In Indalex, Justice Deschamps downplayed the significance of the foregoing 
statement from Century Services, instead emphasizing that creditors’ rights under 
the BIA “remain only shadows until bankruptcy occurs,” so that “at the end of a 
CCAA liquidation proceeding, priorities may be determined by the PPSA’s 
scheme rather than the federal scheme set out in the BIA.”26 This 
acknowledgement of the inconsistency between the two federal insolvency 
regimes not only creates troubling policy implications, but also constitutes a 
departure from the pre-Indalex jurisprudence.  
Inconsistency in priority treatment under the CCAA and the BIA is 
troubling from a public policy perspective. If a claim retained priority under one 
insolvency regime but not under the other, the claimant would have incentives to 
                                                                                                                                         
22 Re Ted Leroy Trucking [Century Services] Ltd., 2010 SCC 60, 3 SCR 379 [Century Services].  
23 Century Services, supra note 22 at para 45. 
24 Ibid at para 23.  
25 Ibid. 





subject the debtor to that regime which would recognize the claimant’s priority. 
The majority in Century Services recognized that such incentives could be created.27 
Indeed, they considered it a key factor influencing the outcome of the case: if the 
Crown’s GST deemed trust retained priority under the CCAA, secured creditors 
would have “skewed incentives against reorganizing under the CCAA”28 and 
would prematurely petition the debtor into bankruptcy in order to subvert the 
Crown’s priority. The majority denounced such opportunistic behaviour as 
“statute shopping” that “can only undermine the [CCAA’s] remedial objectives,” 
namely, to avoid the social and economic costs of liquidation on bankruptcy.29 
The same policy argument ought to be equally applicable to the facts of Indalex: 
if $300,000 in unremitted GST was sufficient to incentivize statute shopping, 
surely a PBA deemed trust to the tune of millions of dollars would have more 
pronounced effects.  
While the SCC in Indalex made no attempt to justify the inconsistent 
approach to priority treatment under the twin insolvency regimes from a policy 
perspective, there are two potential justifications for such an approach. The first 
posits that the adverse effects caused by the “skewed incentives” on the part of 
the secured creditors should not be overblown given the fact that restructuring 
under the CCAA is a debtor-driven process. The debtor company is usually the 
party applying for CCAA protection at the initial hearing, and, moreover, the 
debtor may decide to make such application without notice to any person 
interested in the matter. Section 11 of the CCAA gives courts discretion to grant 
the initial order on an ex parte basis. Accordingly, the secured creditors might not 
exert the same degree of influence on the debtor’s course of action in 
restructuring as the SCC suggested in Century Services. 
This first justification is flawed in that it ignores the practical reality of 
corporate restructuring. A recent article by two leading insolvency practitioners 
                                                                                                                                         
27 Century Services, supra note 22 at para 47.  
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
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illustrates this practical reality.30 Often, a debtor company commences the CCAA 
proceeding with the goal of effecting a sale of the debtor company—a strategy 
commonly known as a “liquidating CCAA”—after having already started 
soliciting offers for a going-concern sale of its business.31 In fact, the preliminary 
sales efforts undertaken by the debtor company are likely to be the reason for 
which a secured creditor agrees to “forbear on enforcing its security.”32 The 
authors also point out that by the time a debtor company is considering a court-
supervised insolvency process, it will have already entered into discussions with 
its secured creditors regarding the various restructuring or liquidation options.33 
Moreover, the judicial test for determining the appropriateness of an initial 
CCAA order is whether the debtor has “a germ of a reasonable and realistic 
plan;”34 accordingly, whether the secured creditors support or are opposed to the 
debtor’s application for CCAA protection is a material factor that the judge 
presiding over the initial hearing will consider.35  
The second potential rationale that could be advanced to downplay the 
importance of curbing secured creditors’ incentives for statute shopping asserts 
that efforts to curb the skewed incentives are unlikely to affect the outcome. 
Secured creditors’ preferred alternative to the CCAA process is to have a receiver 
appointed under the BIA to effect a going-concern sale of the debtor’s business, 
thereby achieving the same outcome as a liquidating CCAA process. This 
argument is also flawed, because it relies on an implicit assumption that 
liquidation on a going-concern basis is the only or ideal outcome attainable in the 
CCAA proceedings. Professor Roderick Wood of the University of Alberta 
observes that the CCAA restructuring regime was originally designed with the 
goal of enabling insolvent corporations to develop a plan of compromise or 
arrangement that would gain the approval of its creditor body.36 Though in recent 
                                                                                                                                         
30 Michelle Grant and Tevia R. M. Jeffries, “Having Jumped Off the Cliffs, When Liquidating Why Choose 
CCAA over Receivership (or vice versa)?”, in Janis Sarra, ed, Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2013 (Toronto: 
Thomson Carswell, 2014) at 325.  
31 Ibid at 343. 
32 Ibid.  
33 Ibid. 
34 Alberta Treasury Branches v Tallgrass Energy Corp, 2013 ABQB 432, AWLD 4492 (Alta QB) [Tallgrass] at para 14 
and 18.  
35 Grant and Jeffries, supra note 30 at 344.  





years the CCAA has increasingly been used to effect asset sales, “we cannot 
conclude from this alone that the traditional restructuring [process by way of a 
plan of compromise or arrangement] is on the road to extinction.”37 Using the 
CCAA process to effect a sale of the debtor company does not always benefit all 
creditors. Secured creditors will support the sale as long as the expected proceeds 
are sufficient to cover their claims, even if it may not maximize recovery by other 
creditors.  
Indalex calls into question the existing case law on the issue of under what 
circumstances a CCAA stay of proceedings should be lifted to permit petitions 
into bankruptcy to proceed. Pre-Indalex, the leading authority was Re Ivaco Inc.38 
There, Justice Farley granted the creditors’ motion to petition the debtor 
companies into bankruptcy on two grounds. First, “[o]ne of the primary purposes 
of a bankruptcy proceeding is to secure an equitable distribution of the debtor’s 
property amongst the creditors.”39 Second, the debtor companies had sold all of 
their operational assets and were “essentially in a distribution of proceeds 
mode.”40 Justice Farley acknowledged that the creditors’ motive was to enhance 
their position by taking advantage of the BIA priority scheme which would give 
them priority over the pension claims. Nonetheless, Justice Farley and the 
ONCA, who later affirmed his decision, were satisfied that Parliament chose the 
BIA, rather than the CCAA, as the regime under which to effect a distribution of 
debtor’s property, including the proceeds of a liquidating CCAA.41  
Indalex casts doubt on the holding in Re Ivaco Inc to the extent that the SCC 
now regards the CCAA as recognizing provincial priorities, subject to 
                                                                                                                                         
37 Ibid at 408.  
38 Re Ivaco Inc. (2006), 56 CCPB 1, 83 OR (3d) 108 (Ont CA); affirming (2005), 47 CCPB 62 (Ont SCJ 
[Commercial List]) [Ivaco].  
39 Ibid at para 13. 
40 Ibid at para 18. 
41 Ibid at para 76. 
146 PENSION, INSOLVENCY AND FIDUCIARY LAW Vol. 25 
 
reprioritization by way of court-ordered super-priority charges. Post-Indalex, a 
new issue that arises at the end of a liquidating CCAA becomes: should courts 
order an immediate distribution of proceeds under the CCAA, or lift the CCAA 
stay to effect a distribution under the BIA? Judicial determination of this issue 
can have a dramatic effect on the rights of vulnerable claimants, such as pension 
plan members, especially where the proceeds of sale are insufficient to satisfy 
secured creditors’ claims. Is such a determination properly within the jurisdiction 
of the courts? It is tempting to answer “yes” by drawing a parallel with the judicial 
discretion of CCAA courts to grant super-priority charges in favour of critical 
suppliers or DIP lenders. However, this parallel is flawed. Whereas the super-
priority charges in favour of critical suppliers or DIP lenders can be justified by 
reference to the CCAA’s remedial objective of facilitating debtor companies’ 
reorganization and avoiding the social and economic costs of bankruptcy, the 
choice between two alternative sets of priority rules for the distribution of sale 
proceeds cannot rely on this reasoning. 
The recent case of Grant Forest Products Inc. v G.E. Canada Leasing Services Co.42 
has not clarified the issue. Justice Campbell granted the motion brought by 
second lien lenders to lift the CCAA stay in order to petition the debtor 
companies into bankruptcy.43 Despite referencing Indalex, Justice Campbell did 
not apply the SCC’s holding in Indalex that provincial priorities may be applied to 
determine distribution in a liquidating CCAA proceeding. Such a holding should 
have even more force on the facts in Grant Forest than in Indalex, as there was no 
court-ordered super-priority prior to the asset sale. Nonetheless, Justice Campbell 
distinguished Indalex on the grounds that the pension plans of GFPI44 were not 
being wound up when the initial order was granted and thus could not have the 
benefit of the PBA deemed trust.45 Consequently, it remains unclear whether a 
PBA deemed trust that is effective under the CCAA and not subverted by any 
court-ordered super-priority may receive payment prior to a bankruptcy order 
being granted. 
                                                                                                                                         
42 Grant Forest Products Inc. v G.E. Canada Leasing Services Co. 2013 ONSC 5933, 7 CCPB (2nd) 239 (Ont SCJ) 
[Commercial List] [Grant Forest]. 
43 Ibid at para 127.  
44 Grant Forest Products Inc., the debtor company.  





As analyzed above, the SCC’s resolution of the priority dispute in Indalex 
exhibits shortcomings. The inconsistencies with its own prior jurisprudence, 
coupled with the attendant public policy concerns, justify a call for the highest 
court in the land to revisit the issue, with a view to improving the functioning of 
Canada’s twin insolvency regimes.  
In opposing Indalex’s motion to seek court approval of the liquidating 
CCAA sale, the pension plan members contended that Indalex had breached the 
fiduciary duty it owed to them in its capacity as the plan administrator.46 This 
issue can be parsed into three sub-issues: (1) whether a pension administrator 
owes a fiduciary duty to the members of its pension plan, (2) what is the content 
of such fiduciary duty, and (3) whether Indalex acted in breach of such fiduciary 
duty in the course of the CCAA proceedings.  
Well-recognized categories of fiduciary relationships exist at common law, 
including trustee-beneficiary, director-company, and solicitor-client relationships. 
These categories are not closed and courts can recognize relationships in novel 
fact settings as attracting fiduciary obligations.47 In Frame v Smith48, Justice Wilson 
set forth three indicia of a fiduciary relationship:  
(1) the fiduciary has scope for the exercise of some discretion or power;  
(2) the fiduciary can unilaterally exercise that power or discretion so as 
to effect the beneficiary’s legal or practical interests; and  
                                                                                                                                         
46 Indalex Ltd., Re, 2011 ONCA 265, 331 DLR (4th) 352, [Indalex (ONCA)] at para 76.  
47 Anthony Duggan, “Fiduciary Obligations in the Supreme Court of Canada: A Retrospective”, 50 Can Bus 
LJ 453 (2011) at 453. 
48 Frame v Smith, [1987] 2 SCR 99, 42 DLR (4th) 81. 
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(3) the beneficiary is peculiarly vulnerable to or at the mercy of the 
fiduciary holding the discretion or power.49  
In Burke v Hudson’s Bay Co.50, the SCC held that “there is no doubt that” the 
three indicia were found in the relationship between the pension plan 
administrator and the employees/beneficiaries under the pension plan.51 Both 
ONCA and the SCC in Indalex cited Burke as binding authority when finding that 
Indalex owed a fiduciary duty to its pension plan members.52 
At common law, a fiduciary owes the principal a number of specific duties, 
including: a duty of loyalty and good faith, commonly formulated as a 
requirement to act solely in the best interests of the principal;53 a duty to avoid 
any actual or perceived conflict of interest;54 a duty of even-handedness requiring 
the fiduciary to treat each beneficiary or class of beneficiaries impartially;55 and a 
duty to disclose “material information sufficient to permit a beneficiary to make 
a fully informed decision.”56 Where the fiduciary is given the powers to manage 
property on behalf of the principal, the fiduciary’s conduct is measured by 
reference to what an ordinary prudent person would do when managing his or 
her own property.57 
While Burke established that a plan administrator is a fiduciary vis-à-vis plan 
beneficiaries at common law, the plan administrator is not subject to all of the 
common law duties mentioned above. The SCC in Burke determined the content 
of a plan administrator’s fiduciary duties based on a close reading of the terms of 
                                                                                                                                         
49 Ibid at 99 (DLR). 
50 Burke v Hudson’s Bay Co., 2010 SCC 34, 2 SCR 273 [Burke].  
51 Ibid at para 41. 
52 Indalex (ONCA), supra note 46 at 117; Indalex (SCC), supra note 1 at 62.  
53 Ari Kaplan and Mitch Frazer, Pension Law, 2nd Edition (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2013) at 323.  
54 Ibid at 324.  
55 Ibid at 331.  
56 Ibid at 334.  





the pension plan documentation as well as the governing pension legislation.58 
The provisions of the plan documentation did not give the employees of 
Hudson’s Bay Company (“HBC”) any equitable interest in the actuarial surplus 
in the pension fund. Thus, the Court held that HBC did not breach its fiduciary 
duty of even-handedness by not transferring a portion of the actuarial surplus to 
the acquiror of HBC’s sold division for the benefit of those employees who were 
transferred to the acquiror. Writing on behalf of a unanimous court, Justice 
Rothstein stated:  
The duty of even-handedness must be anchored in the terms of the 
pension plan documentation. It does not operate in a vacuum … [J]ust 
because HBC has fiduciary duties as plan administrator does not 
obligate it under any purported duty of even-handedness to confer 
benefits upon one class of employees to which they have no right 
under the plan.59 
If a plan administrator’s duty of even-handedness is contextualized based on 
the plan terms, it raises the related question of whether the duty of loyalty or the 
duty to avoid conflicts of interest are similarly contextualized. The ONCA in 
Indalex indicate they are not; after citing Burke, Justice Gillese remarked, “Thus, 
at common law, Indalex as the Plan’s administrator owed a fiduciary duty to the 
Plan’s members and beneficiaries to act in their best interests.”60 
The phrase “act in [the] best interests” is commonly used to refer to the duty 
of loyalty which is “the distinctive and defining feature of fiduciary 
relationships”61 in private law. For example, the phrase is used in corporate 
statutes to impose a fiduciary duty on corporate directors and officers.62 
However, the ONCA’s use of this phrase alone to define the content of Indalex’s 
                                                                                                                                         
58 Burke, supra note 50 at paras 61-82.  
59 Burke, supra note 50 at para 85.  
60 Indalex (ONCA), supra note 46 at para 119.  
61 Lionel Smith, “Fiduciary Relationships: Ensuring the Loyal Exercise of Judgment on Behalf of Another”, 
130 LQR (2014) 608.  
62 For example, s.122(a) of the Canada Business Corporations Act provides, “Every director and officer of a 
corporation in exercising their powers and discharging their duties shall (a) act honestly and in good faith 
with a view to the best interests of the corporation […].” 
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fiduciary duty as plan administrator effectively stretches the holding in Burke 
beyond its intended limit. By contrast, Justice Cromwell, in his concurring 
opinion in Indalex, adopted a view more consistent with the Burke decision. 
Recognizing that "fiduciary duties do not exist at large, but arise from and relate 
to the specific legal interests at stake,”63 he ascertained the nature and scope of 
Indalex’s fiduciary duty “in the legal framework governing the relationship out of 
which the fiduciary duty arises.”64 By “legal framework”, he meant the plan 
documents and the provisions of the PBA relating to pension administration.65 
The statutory duties of an administrator are examined below.  
Under the Ontario PBA, a pension plan administrator has two basic 
statutory functions. Pursuant to s. 19(1) of the PBA, the administrator shall 
ensure that the pension plan and fund are administered in accordance with the 
PBA and the regulations.66 Section 19(3) provides that the administrator shall 
ensure that the pension plan and fund are administered in accordance with the 
terms of the plan.67 Additionally, s. 19(4) provides that s. 19(3) does not enable 
the administrator to administer the pension plan contrary to the PBA and the 
regulations.68 Accordingly, where a conflict arises between the plan terms and the 
statutory requirements, the latter will prevail. This rule gives effect to the principle 
that the PBA is minimum standards legislation that sets out “a statutory ‘floor’ 
beneath which a pension plan’s terms may not fall.”69 Moreover, employers and 
employees are permitted to contract for “enhanced pension benefits greater than 
the minimum standards set forth in the PBA.”70  
In addition to the two statutory functions discussed above, the PBA imposes 
on an administrator a number of specific obligations, including the following: 
                                                                                                                                         
63 Indalex (SCC), supra note 1 at para 185.  
64 Ibid at para 186.  
65 Ibid at para 187. 
66 PBA, supra note 2, s. 19(1).  
67 Ibid, s. 19(3).  
68 Ibid, s. 19(4).  
69 Kaplan and Frazer, supra note 53. 





 s. 22(1) requires the administrator to “exercise the care, diligence and 
skill in the administration and investment of the pension fund that a 
person of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with the 
property of another person”;71  
 s. 22(4) prohibits the administrator from “knowingly permit the 
administrator’s interest to conflict with the administrator’s duties and 
powers in respect of the pension fund”;72  
 ss. 22(9) and 22.1(1) prohibits the administrator from receiving “any 
benefit from the pension plan other than pension benefits, ancillary 
benefits and a refund of contributions” and “reasonable fees and 
expenses relating to the administration of the pension plan and the 
administration and investment of the pension fund;73 
 ss. 25 and 26 prescribe disclosure requirements regarding 
eligible/required plan members and proposed plan amendments, 
respectively;74  
 s. 56(1) requires the administrator “ensure that all contributions are 
paid when due”;75 and  
 where an employer does not pay all contributions when due, the 
administrator must notify the Superintendent pursuant to s. 56(2) of 
the PBA and s. 6.1 of the general regulations76, and s. 59 of the PBA 
permits the administrator to commence court proceedings to obtain 
such payment.77  
A comparison of these statutory duties with the fiduciary duties at common 
law discussed earlier reveals two important observations. First, many of the 
statutory duties resemble but are not identical to the common law fiduciary duties. 
For example, the standard of care set out in s. 22(1) is similar but not identical to 
the common law standard of care. Though both use an “ordinary prudent 
                                                                                                                                         
71 PBA, supra note 2, s. 22(1).  
72 Ibid, s. 22(4). 
73 Ibid, ss. 22(9) and 22.1(1).  
74 Ibid, ss. 25 and 26. 
75 Ibid, s. 56(1).  
76 Ibid, s. 56(2); General, RRO 1990, Reg 909, s. 6.1.  
77 Ibid, s. 59.  
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person” test, the statutory standard considers how an ordinary prudent person 
would act when dealing with the property of another person. In contrast, the 
common law standard considers how the ordinary prudent person would act 
when dealing with her own property. This divergence has led to a general 
recognition that pension plan administrators are subject to a higher standard of 
care than the common law standard.78 Likewise, the conflict-of-interest 
prohibition under s. 22(4) differs from the corresponding duty at common law 
with respect to the knowledge qualifier. 
The second observation is that the Ontario PBA does not expressly 
prescribe a duty of loyalty. Indeed, the words “loyalty” and “best interests” do 
not appear at all in the Act. The same is true for the pension legislation in New 
Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Manitoba. In contrast, the federal Pension Benefits 
Standards Act79 (“PBSA”) as well as five provincial pension statutes expressly 
require administrators to act in the best interests of pension plan members.80 It is 
beyond the scope of this paper to investigate the legislative intent behind the 
absence of a duty of loyalty provision in the Ontario PBA. Nonetheless, the 
discrepancies as identified above between the common law fiduciary duties and 
the statutory duties imposed by the PBA raise an interesting question: namely, 
whether the latter are meant to displace or supplement the former as the legal 
framework governing the relationship between plan administrators and plan 
members. This question is brought into a sharper focus in the context of 
employer-sponsored administration of pension plans.  
Subsection 8(1)(a) of the Ontario PBA expressly permits an employer to act 
as the administrator of its pension plan.81 A corporation that plays the dual role 
as employer-administrator attracts concerns about conflicts of interest for the 
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simple reason that the employer’s own interests do not always align perfectly with 
the interests of the plan beneficiaries. This raises the question of whether a 
fundamental tension exists between s. 8(1)(a) and s. 22(1)(4), and to what extent 
the conflict, if any, affects the content of an employer-administrator’s fiduciary 
duty to plan members.  
Prior to Indalex, the leading case on these questions82 was a decision by the 
Pension Commission of Ontario (“PCO”). In Imperial Oil Ltd v Ontario 
(Superintendent of Pension),83 an employer amended its pension plans for efficiency 
reasons, thereby denying employees enhanced early retirement annuities unless 
they would have been eligible to retire within five years of termination of 
employment. A group of employees challenged the amendment on the grounds 
that the employer, acting in its dual role as employer-administrator, was in conflict 
and acted to the detriment of the employees’ interests contrary to s. 22(4) of the 
PBA.84 The PCO rejected the employees’ argument and set forth three 
propositions comprising what has since been referred to as the “two hats” 
principle: 
1) The PBA clearly distinguishes between the role of an employer and the 
role of an administrator in respect of a pension plan.85 
2) The PBA expressly permits an employer to play both roles even though 
the “two roles may come into conflict from time to time.”86  
3) An act of an employer-administrator its capacity as employer does not 
violate the conflicts-of-interest prohibition in s. 22(4).87  
Essentially, the third proposition states that an employer-administrator is 
subject to the statutory and common law fiduciary duties when it acts in a capacity 
                                                                                                                                         
82 Kaplan and Frazer, supra note 53. 
83 Imperial Oil Ltd v Ontario (Superintendent of Pensions) (1995), 18 CCPB 198 [Imperial Oil]. 
84 Ibid at paras 13-14.  
85 Ibid at para 29.  
86 Ibid at para 30.  
87 Ibid at paras 33-36.  
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qua administrator, but not when it acts qua employer.88 This reflects the underlying 
public policy consideration in favour of allowing employers to make certain 
decisions to its own advantage, rather than in the best interests of the 
employees.89 It follows that the “two hats” principle recognizes the tension that 
exists between ss. 8(1)(a) and 22(1)(4), and attempts to resolve it by limiting the 
scope of the acts of employer-administrators to which the fiduciary duty, and the 
conflict-of-interest prohibition in particular, extend.  
The Indalex case gave the SCC its first opportunity to opine on the validity 
of the “two hats” principle. Justice Deschamps, who penned the reasons for the 
judgment, was patently critical of it. In her view, the conflict-of-interest 
prohibition imposed on an employer-administrator should not be predicated on 
whether the impugned act or decision “can be classified as being related to either 
the management of the corporation or the administration of the pension plan.”90 
She found such a classification unhelpful, because even a sound management 
decision of the employer could have harmful consequences for the plan members. 
By contrast, Justice Cromwell did not explicitly comment on the “two hats” 
principle. His written reasons nevertheless suggest that he supported the rationale 
behind the principle. Specifically, he observed that the dual role of an employer-
administrator is expressly authorized by the PBA and is therefore “an important 
aspect of the legal context for Indalex’s fiduciary duties as a plan administrator.”91 
To this he added: 
The broader business interests of the employer corporation and the 
interests of pension beneficiaries in getting the promised benefits are 
almost always at least potentially in conflict.92  
Therefore, the fact that an act or a decision of the corporation qua 
employer has a potential impact on the plan members’ interests does 
not, in and of itself, constitute a breach of the corporation’s fiduciary 
duty qua administrator.93 
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Justice Deschamps was not unaware of s. 8(1)(a) of the PBA. However, 
unlike Justice Cromwell, she interpreted the provision to be indicative of the 
legislature’s view that not all corporate functions of employer-administrator are 
necessarily in conflict with its duties to the plan members.94 But where a conflict 
does arise, s.22(4) obliges the employer-administrator to resolve the conflict in a 
manner that preserves and protects the plan members’ interests.95 The difference 
of opinion between Justice Deschamps and Justice Cromwell may be 
summarized, without too great a loss of subtlety, as follows: Justice Deschamps 
held an employer-administrator to the same conflict-of-interest prohibition that 
other fiduciaries recognized by law are subject to, whereas Justice Cromwell 
would subject an employer-administrator to a conflict-of-interest prohibition that 
would be modified in light of its statutorily authorized dual role. Justice Cromwell 
modified the conflict-of-interest prohibition by adding two qualifiers to the 
definition of a conflict of interest in respect of an employer-administrator:  
[A] situation of conflict of interest occurs when there is a substantial 
risk that the employer-administrator’s representation of the plan 
beneficiaries would be materially and adversely affected by the 
employer-administrator’s duties to the corporation [emphasis added].96  
Together, these two qualifiers raise the conflict-of-interest prohibition 
applicable to an employer-administrator above the common law no-conflict rule 
applicable to fiduciaries.  
The question of whether Indalex breached its fiduciary obligation turned on 
two interrelated legal issues: (1) whether Indalex found itself in a conflict 
situation, and (2) whether Indalex responded to the situation in accordance with 
its fiduciary duty. 
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Despite their divergent views of the application of the conflict-of-
prohibition to an employer-administrator, Justices Deschamps and Cromwell 
agreed that a conflict arose when Indalex filed the DIP motion. In Justice 
Cromwell’s view, his modified version of the conflict-of-interest prohibition was 
triggered because the super-priority charge sought by Indalex in favour of the 
DIP lenders “could easily have the effect of making it impossible for Indalex to 
satisfy its funding obligations to the plan beneficiaries.”97 The fact that Justices 
Cromwell and Deschamps reached the same conclusion in the result was viewed 
by some insolvency lawyers as a clear message to employer-administrators that 
they must be cognizant of their fiduciary duties to pension plan beneficiaries and 
take active steps to protect and preserve the interest of these plan members, even 
in insolvency.98 
Justice Deschamps and Justice Cromwell agreed that Indalex failed to fulfil 
its fiduciary duty. According to Justice Deschamps, Indalex should have either 
given the plan members notice of the DIP motion so as to give them the 
opportunity to present their arguments against the motion, or found a 
replacement administrator or representative counsel to resolve the conflict.99 
Justice Cromwell reasoned that Indalex should have brought the conflict of 
interest to the attention of the CCAA judge, who would be “well placed” to make 
discretionary decisions on “how best to ensure that the interests of the plan 
beneficiaries are fully represented” in the CCAA proceedings.100 The key 
takeaway here is not the difference between measures of conflict resolution 
favoured by the justices, but rather the common proposition underlying them: 
there are steps short of abandoning its corporate restructuring under the CCAA 
that Indalex could have taken to properly address the conflict. 
That holding attracted criticism from some scholars of fiduciary law; 
Professor Ronald Davis, for instance, argues that it is irreconcilable with the 
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existing common law with respect to fiduciary duty.101 The “long-standing, settled 
doctrine” of fiduciary law prohibits a fiduciary facing a conflict between its own 
interests and its fiduciary duty from terminating the fiduciary relationship in order 
to pursue her interests. Applying this doctrine to the facts of the Indalex case, 
argues Professor Davis, the SCC should have concluded that Indalex was strictly 
prohibited from acting in self-interest—namely, pursuing restructuring under the 
CCAA—when it conflicted with its fiduciary duty to the pension plan 
members.102 In practical terms, this means that Indalex would have been obliged 
to refuse to give its DIP lender super-priority over the pension plan members’ 
claims, or to negotiate a going-concern sale that was conditioned upon the 
purchaser’s assuming the pension liabilities. As Indalex did not take any such 
steps, Professor Davis thinks the SCC should have found Indalex breached its 
fiduciary duty and, as an equitable remedy for such breach, imposed a 
constructive trust on the proceeds from the going-concern sale of assets in favour 
of the pension plan members.103 Yet, as discussed above, the SCC did not order 
an equitable remedy based on constructive trust; rather, it held that Indalex could 
have addressed the conflict by either giving the pension plan members notice of 
the DIP motion, or alternatively finding a replacement administrator or 
representative counsel to resolve the conflict. Professor Davis interprets the 
majority’s holding as tantamount to giving Indalex permission to retire from its 
fiduciary duty for the purpose of pursuing its self-interest.  
Professor Davis further argues that the Court’s crucial error was 
characterizing the conflict facing Indalex, not as a conflict between its self-interest 
and its fiduciary duty as plan administrator (i.e. a conflict of interest and duty), 
but rather as one between the fiduciary duty as plan administrator and the duty 
to act in the best interests of the corporation as required by corporate law (i.e. a 
conflict of duties).104 This difference in characterization is important, Professor 
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Davis points out, because “the law offers different avenues for the fulfillment of 
the obligations of the two different types of fiduciary conflict in certain 
circumstances.”105 The law treats a conflict of duties as amenable to resolution 
through the fiduciary’s withdrawal from one of the duties, while a fiduciary facing 
a conflict of interest and duty is prohibited from continuing to act in self-
interest.106 In Professor Davis’s view, this mischaracterization played a critical role 
in shaping the SCC’s incorrect view on the lengths to which Indalex must go in 
an insolvency process to fulfill its fiduciary duty to the pension plan members. 
He concludes his article with a stinging rebuke directed at the SCC: “the majority 
decision in Sun Indalex Finance has stretched fiduciary doctrine so thin that it is 
almost unrecognizable.”107 
Professor Davis’s criticism is thought-provoking but ultimately flawed. He 
correctly points out that Indalex, as a corporation, is a separate legal person from 
Indalex’s board of directors. This means that the fiduciary obligations owed by 
Indalex as plan administrator are not binding on the directors personally, unless 
exceptional circumstances exist that warrant the piercing of the corporate veil.108 
Conversely, the duty imposed by the corporate statute on Indalex’s directors to 
act in the best interests of the corporation is not a duty assumed by Indalex. 
Professor Davis is also correct that the ONCA’s decision in Indalex contains 
statements that demonstrate the ONCA conflated Indalex’s fiduciary duty to the 
pension plan members with the fiduciary duty owed by Indalex’s directors to the 
corporation.109 However, the SCC majority did not make any similar statements. 
Indeed, Professor Davis himself admits, “It is clear from the language used in the 
SCC majority’s reasons there was a formal recognition that the situation facing 
Indalex involved a conflict between its interests and duty, not a conflict of 
duties”.110 This diminishes the credibility of Professor Davis’s argument that the 
                                                                                                                                         
105 Ibid.  
106 Ibid. 
107 Ibid at 107. 
108 Ibid at 81.  
109 Indalex (ONCA) supra note 46 at paras 140-42.  





ONCA’s mischaracterization was adopted by the SCC and “played a critical role 
in that result.”111 
More significant, Professor Davis’s entire article rests on a questionable 
assumption that the facts of Indalex call for a simple, straightforward application 
of traditional principles of fiduciary duty at common law, developed mainly from 
cases concerning solicitor-client relations or corporate fiduciaries’ taking of 
corporate opportunities for personal gains. The Indalex case differed from these 
cases in that the conflict situation facing Indalex was engendered by its statutorily 
authorized dual role as employer-administrator. To address this unique fact 
situation, the majority of the SCC ascertained the nature and scope of Indalex’s 
fiduciary duty having regard to the legal framework in which the corporation 
acted as a fiduciary. One part of that legal framework was the Ontario PBA, which 
authorized the dual role of employer-administrator – and its attendant potential 
for conflict, if you agree with Justice Cromwell. The other part of that legal 
framework was the CCAA, as the particular context in which the actual conflict 
of interest facing Indalex arose. The CCAA proceedings had neither the purpose 
nor the effect of extinguishing Indalex’s pension obligations.112 Rather, an initial 
order granted by the CCAA judge operated only to “freeze”113 the rights of 
pension beneficiaries and other creditors of Indalex alike in order to “preserv[e] 
the status quo for the benefit of all stakeholders.”114 This is why neither Justice 
Deschamps nor Justice Cromwell viewed Indalex’s decision to commence CCAA 
proceedings as being on its own a breach of its fiduciary obligation to avoid 
conflict of interests. Both Justices showed empathy for the serious financial 
difficulty confronting Indalex. For this same reason, it is overly simplistic and 
disingenuous to characterize, as Professor Davis does, Indalex’s quest for a 
solution to its insolvency under the CCAA as no more than a corporate 
fiduciary’s attempt to pursue its own interests at the expense of the plan 
beneficiaries to whom it owes fiduciary obligations. Thus, as the above analysis 
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shows, it is incorrect to characterize this case as one to be decided strictly in 
accordance with the common law governing fiduciaries. 
So far this paper has analyzed and critiqued the SCC’s handling of two major 
legal issues in the Indalex case: the priority treatment of PBA deemed trusts under 
the CCAA, and the fiduciary duties of an employer-administrator in the course 
of the CCAA proceedings. Though the SCC approached the PBA deemed trust’s 
priority under the CCAA and Indalex’s fiduciary duty as two separate issues, these 
are actually interrelated. The SCC’s handling of these two issues in Indalex creates 
a legal contradiction for employer-administrators that are in or near insolvency. 
 Recall that, as discussed in Section III, the SCC in Indalex found that 
priorities created by provincial statutes, including the PBA deemed trust, remain 
effective in CCAA proceedings, subject to the doctrine of federal paramountcy. 
The Court also held that no deemed trust could arise under s. 57(4) of the PBA 
in the case of a pension plan—such as Indalex’s executive plan—that had not 
been wound up when the proceedings under the CCAA were initiated.115 These 
two holdings combine to produce a crucial implication: where a pension plan has 
a wind-up deficiency, that wind-up deficiency will not be deemed to be held in 
trust in favour of the plan beneficiaries under s. 57(4) of the PBA when the 
employer seeks the CCAA protection unless the plan is wound up before the 
commencement of the CCAA proceedings. Post-Indalex, any employer-
administrator that is aware of this implication can entirely avoid liability for the 
wind-up deficiency by not winding up its pension plan voluntarily prior to seeking 
relief under the CCAA. As soon as the corporation obtains an initial order under 
the CCAA, if it has not previously wound up the pension plan, then the 
beneficiaries’ claim to the wind-up deficiency loses the benefit of the PBA 
deemed trust. Instead, it is treated as an unsecured claim under the CCAA. Such 
an outcome clearly prejudices the interests of the plan beneficiaries. 
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The question of whether an employer-administrator’s decision to 
deliberately avoid winding up its pension plan before commencing the CCAA 
proceedings amounts to a breach of its fiduciary duty to the plan beneficiaries 
remains unresolved. The SCC in Indalex did not offer any coherent guidance on 
this question. On the one hand, the employer’s act arguably triggers the conflict-
of-interest prohibition—even the higher threshold favoured by Justice 
Cromwell—because the loss of the PBA deemed trust “materially and adversely 
affect[s]”116 the plan members’ interest. On the other hand, the majority of the 
SCC in Indalex stated that a corporation’s decision to seek protection under the 
CCAA is not itself a breach of its fiduciary duty as administrator. A stay of 
proceedings granted under the CCAA does not extinguish the employer’s 
pension obligations;117 rather, it “freezes”118 the rights of the plan members and 
creditors alike in order to “preserv[e] the status quo for the benefit of all 
stakeholders.”119 This is why neither Justice Deschamps nor Justice Cromwell 
viewed Indalex’s decision to commence proceedings under the CCAA alone as a 
breach of its fiduciary obligation to avoid conflict of interests. Moreover, where 
the employer initiates proceedings under the CCAA with the intent of 
restructuring (as opposed to effecting a liquidation), the employer generally will 
not wind up the plan prior to the filing. Instead, the employer will retain its 
employees and allow their benefits under the pension plan to continue accruing 
after the employer initiates insolvency proceedings. If the pension plan is 
incorporated into a collective agreement, the employer may well lack any 
authority to wind up the plan unilaterally. A legal contradiction thus emerges. In 
affirming the priority of the PBA deemed trust under the CCAA, the SCC 
inadvertently brought the interests of the pension plan members into conflict 
with the employer-administrator’s self-interest in pursuing a course of action for 
purposes of corporate restructuring; the Court emphatically declared that course 
of action not to be a breach of fiduciary duty. 
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To resolve this contradiction, one must look outside the confines of 
fiduciary law. One solution is regulatory oversight. An employer-administrator is 
statutorily obligated to ensure that the pension plan and fund are administered in 
accordance with the PBA and the regulations.120 In particular, s. 68(6) authorizes 
the Superintendent of Financial Services to change the effective date of a wind 
up by order.121 In theory, the Superintendent could change the effective date to a 
date preceding the employer-administrator’s filling under the CCAA so as to 
preserve the plan members’ claim for a PBA deemed trust in respect of any wind-
up deficiencies. However, one of the current policies of the Financial Services 
Commission of Ontario (FSCO) confines the effective date of a wind up to no 
earlier than the date of the specific event that triggers the wind up, such as 
insolvency.122 Therefore, the FSCO’s policy should be amended to allow the 
Superintendent to exercise her authority under s. 68(6) for the benefit of the plan 
members. 
The insolvency of a business that sponsors pension plans for its employees 
presents a scenario layered with complexities. As Justice Cromwell puts it, 
“Pension plans and creditors find themselves in a zero-sum game with not 
enough money to go around.”123 In an attempt to preserve and protect the rights 
of vulnerable pension plan members, the SCC declared the deemed trust 
provisions in the PBA to be generally effective under the CCAA, subject to 
certain exceptions. Though well-intentioned, this holding creates an inconsistency 
between Canada’s two federal insolvency regimes, raising the spectre of statute 
shopping as well as diminishing the coherence of the case law. On the second 
issue of Indalex’s fiduciary duty, the majority appeared divided on the validity of 
the “two hats” principle, but nevertheless agreed that Indalex’s failure to take 
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active steps to properly resolve the conflict violated the conflict of interest 
prohibition.  
The interplay between the SCC’s holdings on these two issues, while not 
explicitly considered by the Court, has in fact created a legal contradiction that 
seemingly cannot be resolved using the existing jurisprudence on either the 
CCAA priorities or the fiduciary duty of the employer-administrator. This 
indicates an unmistakable need for Parliament and provincial legislatures to 
provide courts with clearer guidance, and they should seize the opportunity to 
properly balance the interests of pension plan beneficiaries and other 
stakeholders.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
